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Introduction 
For the past decades or so China has been recording 
spectacular economic growth as it has implemented a wide-
ranging transformation of its economic system. China has 
moved from a closed centrally-planned economy to become one 
of the world’s major trading nations and the largest recipient of 
foreign investment. However, these dramatic economic changes 
have brought with them changes in the social and political 
perceptions, values and aspirations of the Chinese people. The 
challenge for the Chinese leadership is to manage the various 
competing demands and chart a balanced mode of development 
and modernization. 
The new Chinese leadership, encapsulated in Hu Jintao, 
who became Party Secretary-General in November 2002 and 
State President in March 2003, and Wen Jiabao, who became 
Premier in March 2003, has stressed the elements of continuity 
with the past, but at the same time has begun to slowly establish 
a more populist style of governance. The SARS outbreak was an 
early test of the new leaders’ mettle from which they emerged 
with some credit, but other challenges have also had to be faced: 
rising concern over corruption, the war in Iraq and its aftermath, 
heightened rhetoric as Taiwanese presidential elections come 
closer, and international pressures for currency revaluation. 
In late September 2003, the Centre for Asian Pacific 
Studies hosted a Workshop on ‘China under the New 
Leadership’ to examine some of the challenges that the Hu-Wen 
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leadership faces and assess their record to date. The participants 
and presenters drawn from academia, the media, the diplomatic 
community and the business world joined in discussions which 
ranged widely over domestic politics, foreign policy, economic 
policy and social issues. Included in this Working Paper are two 
of the presentations, which have been up-dated and revised; they 
are printed in the original language of presentation. Dr Ma Yue, 
from Lingnan University’s Department of Economics, examines 
the implications of China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organisation, while Wang Ping, the Deputy Editor-in-Chief 
with China Review, discusses the impact of the development of 
the private sector on China’s economy.  
In conclusion, I would like to thank Dr Wong Yiu-chung, 
of Lingnan University’s Department of Politics and Sociology, 
for conceiving and planning this Workshop. 
 
Brian Bridges  
Associate Director of CAPS 
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The Impact of China's Accession to the WTO* 
઼̚ˢ͵ޢ۞ܐՎड़ᑕ̶ژ 
Yue Ma (੺᜙)+ 
 
ၡࢋ!
ώ͛ࢵА੅ኢ઼̚ˢ͵݈۞˘ֱᇎᇋĎ൒ޢܐՎ̶ژ
઼̚ˢ͵ޢ۞ड़ᑕ̈́༊݈ˠϔ။̿ࣃ۞ۋኢĄԧࣇ۞ඕኢ
ߏൺഇ̰ˠϔ။ᑕྍܲ޺ᘦؠĄҭ૟ֽ୧ІјሢޢĎˠϔ
။ᑕѣዋ༊۞ঙજቑಛĎͽዋᑕ઼̰γགྷᑻ୧І۞ត̼Ą
఺ֱ୧ІΒ߁གྷᑻטޘԼࢭ۞ซ˘ՎԆචĎͽᑕ;઼̚ˢ
͵ޢ۞߄ጼĄ 
Abstract 
This paper will first review the early concerns about 
China's entry to the WTO. Then we will evaluate the preliminary 
impact of the WTO membership on the Chinese economy, which 
turned out to be better than expected. We also discuss the 
current international debate on the Chinese currency renminbi 
revaluation and suggest that a gradual improvement of the 
current Chinese rigid exchange rate system will be inevitable. 
                                                 
* Paper prepared for the Workshop on China under New Leadership 
which was held on 30 September 2003 and organized by the Centre for 
Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong. I would like to 
thank Dr Y C Wong to invite me to present this paper in the Workshop 
and Professor Barton Starr and other workshop participants for their 
useful comments on an early draft of this paper. 
+ Associate Professor in Economics, Dept of Economics, Lingnan University, 
Tuen Mun, Hong Kong. Fax: + (852) 2891 7940; Tel (852) 2616 7202; Email: 
yuema@Ln.edu.hk. Internet: http://www.Ln.edu.hk/econ/staff/yuema 
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Finally we will explore the potential problems and challenges to 
both economies of mainland China and Hong Kong in the future. 
We argue that international competitions apparently are 
competitions among quality of goods and services, technological 
software and hardware. In fact, it is competitions among the 
institutions. As only the better institutions may attract more 
resources internationally including both physical capital and 
human capital. China's determination to enter the WTO after 15 
years of long negotiations is as significant as her initial reform 
from the central planned economy towards a market economy. It 
signifies that China will reform her traditional market economy 
towards an internationally competitive market for the 21st 
century's New Economy. Furthermore, Without doubt, facing 
such unprecedented challenges both from mainland China and 
new world economy, Hong Kong must reform her political and 
economic institutions to foster a new economic partnership with 
mainland China to sustain her high income and high growth 
rate in the future.  
 
In this paper I'll first review the early concerns about 
China's entry to the WTO. Then I will evaluate the preliminary 
impact of the WTO membership on the Chinese economy. 
Finally I will discuss the potential problems and challenges to 
both economies of mainland China and Hong Kong in the future. 
At the time when China joined the WTO, the main 
concerns were focused on her agricultural. The Chinese 
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agricultural sector has been fully-protected by the government's 
high tariff policy in the past.  
The productivity of Chinese agricultural sector is low and 
its international competitiveness is weak. The concessions that 
the Chinese government made in the WTO agreement was 
believed to be detrimental to the agricultural sector. Given the 
fact that the Chinese agricultural population is about 60-70% of 
the total population, the negative impact on the agricultural 
sector might spill over to other sectors and might create social 
unrest that would  disruptive to national economy as a whole. 
Another major concern at that time was the 
competitiveness of domestic industrial sector. It turned out that 
in January and March 2003, one year after China joined the 
WTO, the Chinese trade balances went into deficits at the first 
time after consecutive seven years of surplus since 1994 (cf. 
Table 1). People started to concern about the stability of the 
Chinese currency renminbi as well.  
Furthermore, with the intensified competition from foreign 
enterprises, the banking sector’s bad debt problem becomes only 
more difficult and takes more time to resolve (Zhao, et al, 2002). 
The picture of the WTO membership was unclear. There was 
even suggestion for China to withdraw from the WTO! 
Today, after more than one year WTO membership, the 
initial impact, however, does not seem to be severe. In fact, the 
economy is better than people expected.  
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The GDP growth rate in year 2002 was 8%.  Despite the 
SARS, the GDP growth rates at the 1st and 2nd quarters in 2003 
were 9.9% and 8.2%, respectively (cf. Table 2). All are high 
than 7.3% in year 2001 before China joined the WTO. 
The agricultural sector survived well with growth rate of 
2.9% in 2002 and average growth rate of 3.1% in the 1st half of 
2003. All are higher than the 2.8% growth rate in 2001 before 
the entry to the WTO.  
The exports of the agricultural products have been actually 
increased, thanks to the unexpected rise of international price of 
agricultural products during 2002. The imports of agricultural 
products have been constrained because of the slow reduction of 
tariffs along the WTO agreement and the fact that the import 
agents are restricted to be only the state-owned trading 
companies.  
For the Chinese economy as a whole, overall trading 
surplus reemerged as well after the temporary trade deficits in 
the early 2003. At the first time, the China’s trade surplus 
against US is larger than the Japan’s trade surplus against US. 
Also at the same time, foreign direct investment surged and 
China has taken over the US to become the largest recipient 
country of FDI in the world in 2002. The beneficial effects of 
FDI on the Chinese economy are well-documented (Tsang and 
Ma, 1997). 
The trade surplus together with a large inflow of FDI is 
good news for China. However, every coin has its two sides. 
International pressure on the renminbi revaluation has been 
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increasing. Ironically, this time the pressure is not from 
speculators but from politicians of Chinese major trading 
partners in US, Europe, and Asia. China has been subject to 
repeated criticisms from her trading partners recently on her 
fixed exchange rate policy. An economic problem has turned 
into a political dispute. How to resolve this dispute has become 
an urgent research topic. 
Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to this problem. Let 
me just spell out some aspects of he complexity of this issue 
without getting too much details due to time constraint. The 
reform of the Chinese exchange rate system is related to the 
sequence of the Chinese capital account liberalization and the 
process of full convertibility of the renminbi (Liu, et al, 2002). It 
is also related to the problem of bad debt problem of the Chinese 
banking sector. More importantly, it is related to the impact on 
the economy here in Hong Kong, especially on the stability of 
the Hong Kong dollar since the China factor on the economy of 
Hong Kong is prominent (Ma, et al, 1998).  
Internationally, an unstable renminbi and the consequential 
economic slow down in China would also generate negative 
impacts on the world economy, especially on the US and other 
Asian regional economies (Tsang and Ma, 2002). Furthermore, 
a large sale of US government bonds by the Chinese 
government at the eve before a large reevaluation of renminbi 
would increase the market interest rates in the US. This clearly 
is not the consequence the US government would like to see. In 
fact, the Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in 
China pointed out that one of the major beneficiaries of the 
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stable renminbi is the US multinationals invested in China and 
the US domestic consumers who enjoyed the cheap Chinese 
goods (Kynge, 2003).  
However, on the other hand, a rigid, non-market 
determined exchange rate system is also no good for the Chinese 
economy in the long run. This is especially true when the 
domestic market of China will have been built up and is big and 
strong enough to buffer international shocks on the renminbi.  
Therefore, on the balance, we would expect that another 
well-accepted gradual reform on the renminbi system in the near 
future is inevitable, both to release the international political 
pressure and to improve the exchange rate system itself. In 
addition, it is like to inject a vaccine into the Chinese trading 
sector, the industrial sector, the banking sector, and the Chinese 
individuals to enhance their ability to cope with the future full-
scale fluctuations of renminbi (Ma, 2003). 
Looking into the future, China's entry to the WTO is a 
challenge to the economy and institutions in Hong Kong as well. 
International competitions apparently are competitions among 
the quality of goods and services, technological software and 
hardware. In fact, it is competitions among the institutions. As 
only the better institutions may attract more resources 
internationally including both physical capital and human 
capital.  
China's determination to enter the WTO after 15 years of 
long negotiations is as significant as her initial reform from the 
central planned economy towards a market economy (Ma, 2001). 
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It signifies that China will reform her traditional market 
economy towards an internationally competitive market for the 
21st century's New Economy.  
Furthermore, China has also started her reform of 
government structures. For example, more than 2,300 legal and 
regulations have been abolished or have been replaced by the 
new ones to comply with the WTO accession agreement. Indeed, 
in the testimony before the U.S. Trade Representative in 
Washington, D.C., in August 2002, the Chairman of the 
American Chamber of Commerce in China commented, "In our 
view, the Chinese government is demonstrating a serious 
commitment to meeting its WTO obligations." 
However, skepticism about China's willingness to keep its 
WTO promises has increased since then. Only 20 percent of 
companies, responding to a survey of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in China and the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Shanghai, said Beijing is "willing, able and prepared to 
implement changes in the spirit of the WTO agreement" 
(McDonald, 2003). At the other extreme, 30 percent of 
respondents thought China was willing to follow only the letter 
of WTO commitments or is looking for ways to avoid making 
changes.  
On the positive side, four out of five businesses surveyed 
said their revenues in China rose last year, while 75 percent said 
they were profitable, the report said. Nevertheless, it says, China 
has to show that it is responsive to rising foreign concern about 
its compliance with WTO commitments. 
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It is also interesting to point out the recent shift of the 
regional distribution of the FDI within China. Just after a few 
months after China entered the WTO, the share of FDI in 
Yangtze River Delta around Shanghai has surpassed the Pearl 
River Delta in Guangdong. The regional competition for 
resources is intensive (Li and Ma, 1996). Most of these new FDI 
to Shanghai are hi-tech or knowledge-based industries rather 
than those labour intensive, traditional ones in the Guangdong 
province. If this trend continues, the relative importance of Pearl 
River Delta would decline and her neighbour Hong Kong would 
be affected as well. 
Without doubt, facing such unprecedented challenges both 
from mainland China and new world economy, Hong Kong 
must reform her political and economic institutions to foster a 
new economic partnership with mainland China to sustain her 
high income and high growth rate in the future.  
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Table 1. China’s Monthly Export and Import (in 100 mil. US$) 
 
 Date        Export      Import 
 1994  1210.1  1156.2 
 1995  1487.8  1320.8 
 1996  1510.5  1388.3 
 1997  1827.9 1423.7 
 
 1998  1837.1  1402.4 
 1999  1949.3  1657.0 
 2000  2492.0  2250.9 
 2001  2661.0  2435.5 
 
 2002.01     217.0    189.8 
 2002.02     191.4    159.1 
 2002.03     238.3    224.4 
 
 2002.04     267.3    257.5 
 2002.05     246.4    224.4 
 2002.06     260.1    230.9 
 
 2002.07     292.1    269.9 
 2002.08     294.4    272.1 
 2002.09     319.0    297.8 
 
 2002.10     299.4    251.9 
 2002.11     312.1    287.3 
 2002.12     318.9    287.3 
 
 2003.01     298.2    310.2 
 2003.02     245.0    237.6 
 2003.03     320.8    325.1 
 
 2003.04     356.0    345.9 
 2003.05     338.3    316.1 
 2003.06     344.8    323.4 
 
 2003.07     381.1    365.1 
 
Source: China’s Customs Statistical Office (ঔᙯᓁཌტЪ௚ࢍΦ) 
Website: http://www.customs.gov.cn/tongjishujv/Book1.files/sheet003.htm 
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Table 2. China’s Economic Annual Growth Rates (%) 
 
Date   GDP   Agriculture  Industry   Service 
1990    3.8 7.3  3.2  2.3 
1991    9.2 2.4 13.9  8.8 
1992   14.2 4.7 21.2 12.4 
1993   13.5 4.7 19.9 10.7 
 
1994   12.6 4.0 18.4  9.6 
1995   10.5 5.0 13.9  8.4 
1996    9.6 5.1 12.1  7.9 
1997    8.8 3.5 10.5  9.1 
 
1998    7.8 3.5  8.9  8.3 
1999    7.1 2.8  8.1  7.7 
2000    8.0 2.4  9.4  8.1 
2001    7.3 2.8  8.7  7.4 
 
2002 8.0 2.9  9.9  7.3 
 
2003Q1  9.9 3.5 12.3  7.6 
2003Q2  8.2 2.7 11.6  4.2 
     
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China. 
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Chinese Private Enterprises 
ռᒉགྷᑻůů઼̚߆གྷࢲШᇾ 
Wang Ping (ͳπ) 
 
Abstract 
The paper argues that the development of the private sector 
has, in fact, become the indicator of China’s national economy. 
A norm could be derived from the economic development during 
the reform and open era in the past two decades: the fewer 
restrictions imposed by the state, the faster is the economy 
development of China. Furthermore, the paper argues that there 
is a close relationship between economic modernization and 
traditional cultural traits which are based on Confucian clan-
familial network. The paper believes that these traits would 
become powerful facilitators in China’s modernization drive. 
 
઼̂̚ౙ۞གྷᑻ൴ण఺ೀѐࠎ͵ࠧ៘ϫĂߏ̂ݭགྷᑻ
វ㝯ࢬјಶ౵ࠎܪᚊ۞ĄΝѐ̂ౙ۞ GDP ̏གྷ྿זȈ༱ᆆ
പ။Ă̫ѐᔵ൒צז“ܧ׏”ᇆᜩĂҭߏᓁវ˯෹࿅Νѐᑕྍ
ߏ՟ѣયᗟ۞Ą 
઼̂̚ౙགྷᑻ۞൴णᄃռᒉགྷᑻ۞ుՎᎸ஽Ă൑Ⴗߏ
૜̷࠹ᙯ۞ć઼҃छ၆ٺռᒉགྷᑻ۞ၗޘĂ၆ٺξಞགྷᑻ
д̂ౙ۞߆ڼᄮТăҋ͹ҋϤޥຐ۞ۺؠ׍ѣ޽ᇾຍཌྷĄ
ЯѩĂԧࣇΞͽ఼࿅៍၅ռᒉགྷᑻ࿅Ν˟Ȉѐ۞ශ܂ăѡ
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Զ൴णăుՎᎸ஽Ăֽࡁտ઼̂̚ౙ߆ڼགྷᑻ۞តࢭ࿅
඀Ą 
གྷᑻࢲШᇾ!
д˟࿬࿬˟ѐĂܧ઼ѣགྷᑻ۞யࣃࡗҫ GDP Њᗝ۞ˬ
̶̝˟Ă׎̚ৌϒϤռᒉЋຽԆј۞Њᗝд˟̶̝˘ͽ
˯Ąϫ઼݈̚дᄦౄຽ㝯ࢬĂѣ˘Ѻк჌யݡፂٺ͵ࠧௐ
˘Ăͧт࿪ෛ፟ă࿪ДቐăDVDă຋گᚤăᇝћ֘ඈĄ 
˘ؠຍཌྷ˯ᄲĂ઼̚ռᒉགྷᑻ̏གྷјࠎ̂ౙགྷᑻ޺ᜈ
൴ण۞͹ࢋજ˧Ąᄃ઼ѣЋຽăˬྤЋຽăγથ፾ྤ࠹
ͧĂ఺ֱѐјܜ౵ԣ۞ᔘߏώ˿ݭ۞ռᒉЋຽĄ 
ԧࣇ̂छౌܧ૱ሢଉ۞̂ౙᄬ֏ಶߏ“Լࢭฟٸ”Ăѣ៍
ᕇᄮࠎԼࢭ͹ࢋߏ၆̰۞Ăฟٸ͹ࢋߏ၆γ۞Ą׎၁ԧࣇ
а࿅ᐝֽ࠻Ăҋ˛Ȉѐ΃ϐˣȈѐ΃ܐฟؕĂ઼̂̚ౙ၆
ٺռᒉགྷᑻ˵ߏଳפ“ుՎٸฟ”۞͞ёĂࡇߏѝഇϤٺ߆ڼ
Ϡၗ׶ۤົ៍ه۞ࢨטĂՎᆹܧ૱ᓞᙱĄ 
ᐌ඾ξಞ˧ณૻ̼ĂপҾξಞ߱͘۞ᇃھྻϡĂռᒉ
གྷᑻ۞၁˧֝ిᕖૺĂֹ଀ϔᒉЋຽ̏གྷు႙ѣਕ˧·Ї
ͽـϤ઼छଠט۞ኜкҖຽĄᙯڦ઼̂̚ౙགྷᑻ۞ˠ̀ົ
൴னĂ઼ᒉЋຽ۞யݡ̏གྷଂ˟Ȉѐ݈۞Βᘲ༱ѣĂᒺഴ
זࡇѣֱ֤၆ٺ઼छ۞߆ڼщБă࢕ְщБăགྷᑻщБă
ᒖဩщБ׍ѣՙؠّຍཌྷ۞ᅳાĂͧт࢕̍Ћຽăਝ͇ਝ
۩Ąᐌ඾ξಞགྷᑻវט۞ซ˘ՎԆචĂܛᏉă఼ੈăਕ໚
ඈͽـᚑॾࢨטռᒉགྷᑻΒ߁γ઼ྤώซˢ۞ᅳાĂனд
̏གྷుՎ“ฟٸ”Ą 
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Ϥٺ઼̂̚ౙ߆عѣຍဦгଯજ઼ੜϔซĂϏֽռᒉ
Ћຽд઼̚གྷᑻ̚۞гҜ૟ົซ˘Վ଀ז೩̿Ą 
ᓁඕ࿅Ν˟Ȉкѐ઼̂̚ౙ۞གྷᑻ൴णĂΞͽᄲĂ༊
ռᒉགྷᑻ൴णͧྵึӀ۞ॡ࣏ĂՏ༊઼छ၆ռᒉགྷᑻ۞ࡗ
Ձͧྵᆵᗫ۞ॡ࣏Ăــ˵ߏ̂ౙགྷᑻ൴णͧྵԣ۞ॡ
ഇĂЯࠎ఺჌ล߱ــҡᐌ඾Җ߆̒࿰۞ࢫҲăν้ຍᙊ
ԛၗᇆᜩ۞˭ࢫĄЯѩΞͽᄲռᒉЋຽ׍ѣགྷᑻࢲШᇾ۞
үϡĄ 
઼̚ռᒉЋຽ̏ҫ઼̚གྷᑻΗጨѯ̋Ăགྷᑻ˧ณ̏གྷ
ు႙ؼҩז߆ڼᅳાĂҭߏצ็௚۞ᇆᜩĂռᒉЋຽ͹̬
ˢ߆ڼĂϫ݈۞ૄώΑਕᔘߏ“ࡓ౤થˠ”Ą҃ଂ੺ҹޥ“གྷ
ᑻૄᖂՙؠ˯ᆸޙ᎝”ֽ࠻Ă઼̚۞ࡓ౤થˠ၆ٺᝋ˧۞ᇆ
ᜩ૟ົດֽດ̂ĄȈ̱̂ѣ˘ֱռᒉЋຽछтቼᐁૈăՔ
͛ၷඈ΍ЇБ઼ᛨ΃ܑĂѣˠᄮࠎȈ˛̂۞ॡ࣏ົѣռᒉ
ЋຽछᒔᏴ̚δ؎ࣶĄ 
ଂԈ៍˯࠻Ă߆ڼ׶གྷᑻߏᙱͽ̶छ۞Ăдߙֱॡ
࣏Ăགྷᑻјܜώ֗ಶߏે߆۰౵ࢦࢋ۞߆ڼྤώć҃дޝ
кॡ࣏Ă߆ڼᄃགྷᑻ۞։ّ̢જĂ˜ߏགྷᑻπᘦԣి൴ण
۞ࢦࢋ୧ІĄ༊ѐ̂ౙщᑔ࠷ᆂวгડ˵ಶߏځ͉য়Ѧ̮
ራ۞ҁछ۞ೀ͗ྺϔĂಶߏϡࢎϲ“ϠѪ͛३”۞ԛёĂֽએ
એг၁ҖΒயז͗఺჌ࣧؕ۞ϠயЪү͞ё۞Ą఺჌͞ё
дࢶപˠீ̚ᖎۡߏ͇གྷгཌྷ۞རޢϠய͞ёĂҭߏд༊
ॡ۞઼̂̚ౙĂ఺჌Җࠎࢬ၆۞߆ڼࢲᐍߏλ̂Ăᐌॡົ
ග΁ࣇ۞Ϡ׻ౄјխᙱĄ˵ϒߏ఺჌።Ϋ۞ᒖဩЯ৵Ăֹ
଀఺ֱྺϔдϠхώਕ۞ᜭֹ˭ү΍۞གྷᑻҖࠎĂ׎၆̚
઼ۤົٙ׍ѣ۞ܜᅈ߆ڼຍཌྷĂ඗၆̙Ҳٺ׎ன၁۞གྷᑻ
ຍཌྷĄ 
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ЯѩĂԧତ˭ֽಶଂռᒉЋຽ͹߆ڼгҜ۞តֽ̼ҥ
ᙋռᒉЋຽүࠎ઼̚߆གྷࢲШᇾ۞ҿᕝĄ 
߆ڼࢲШᇾ!
̂छౌۢ྽Ă̂ౙ඾ЩᇆᜩᆒፍᇉдȈ̱݈̂Яࠎએ
ඁ႒ඁజԹĂ׎дБ઼к఍г͞۞ࡗ˟Ȉ఍ٗயజٮ኱Ą
ҭߏ౵ܕ˫జٸ˞΍ֽĄҭߏ఺Іְଐ۞ᇆᜩᔘдٺȈ̱
݈̂ѣᙯಱˠੑಱֽ໚યᗟۋኢĄ༊ॡˬ࣎΃ܑଯ΍Ăѣ
៍ᕇᄮࠎΞͽឰռᒉЋຽछˢᛨĂ˵ѣˠિՙͅ၆Ą 
ࠎࠤᆃ“ˬ࣎΃ܑ”׶ռᒉЋຽछˢᛨົд઼̂̚ౙ͔੓
ᇃھ۞੅ኢĂҌ̫ᔘۋኢ̙Ѓĉ 
дࢶപܜ̂۞ѐᅅ˘΃ĂΞਕ၆Вயᛨ۞ᄮᙊҬߏ҃
ܧĂࠤҌϤٺಫវ۞ቡ߇҃၆Вயᛨ׍ѣӼᜲ̼۞ᄮᙊĄ
˘࣎ࢶപ۞੼̚ϠഅགྷયԧĈ“ߏ̙ߏࡇѣВய઼छ۞ˠ̖
Ыۓĉ”Ăԧ༊ॡࣵ৯̙଀ĂΪрય΁ᔹ઼ߏ̙ߏВய઼
छĉ΁ᄲ̙ߏćԧᄲĂ͵ࠧ˯ಙۓ҇౵΍Щ۞඗၆̙ߏ̚
઼ˠĂ҃ߏᔹ઼ˠĄ 
̳π҃ኢĂ઼̂̚ౙ౵ᐹս۞ˠ̖Ăѣޝ̂ొ̶ߏΐ
ˢ˞઼̚Вயᛨ۞ĄЯࠎ˘࣎ૄώ۞Я৵ಶߏĂтڍҰ՟
ѣਕ˧Ă՟ѣр۞ཏிૄᖂĂߏͧྵᙱͽ఼࿅͚ొෞᛉ఺
˘ᙯ۞Ą˵ϒߏЯࠎВயᛨጾѣ߆ڼྤ໚֭ะ̚˞̂Բᐹ
սˠ̖Ăд̂ౙۤົ׍ѣૻ̂۞ᇆᜩ˧Ă̖ѣռᒉЋຽ͹
ԓ୕ΐˢ઼̚ВயᛨĄ 
ᔵ൒ԧࣇଂޝкಫវ˯࠻ז̂ౙޝкలءౌߏВயᛨ
ࣶĂҭߏԧࣇ˵ᑕྍ࠻זĂலౣ઼̚Вயᛨम̙кѣ˛˼
༱ᛨࣶĂͷ“൑̖̙֖ͽᑻೋ”Ă˘͞ࢬ఺ֱలءࡇߏ͌ᇴच
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ཏ̝੺ĂΩ˘͞ࢬᄲځВயᛨᔘߏڦࢦӛৼˠ̖۞ć҃఺
ֱలءĂ˵֭ܧ˘ฟؕಶߏᗼˠĂӎ݋΁ࣇ˵ޝᙱѣ፟ົ
జॢ̿זޝ੼۞ҜཉĄ 
ҭߏĂଂВயᛨ۞ّኳֽᄲߏࢋ౵௣ঐໝࣤ݇ล৺
۞Ă҃ռᒉЋຽ͹ಶߏ็௚ؠཌྷ˭۞׏ݭ۞ࣤ݇ล৺Ą֤
ᆃĂ૟˘ཏҋ̎౵௣ࢋঐໝ۞ˠӛৼזҋ̎۞ੱᒉ㝯ࢬ
ֽĂ֭ͷ఺࣎ཏវܧ૱Ξਕ఼࿅ԼតВயᛨ۞፟វĂซ҃
ԼតВயᛨ۞ّኳĂ఺ߏ̙ЪទᏭ۞Ą֤ᆃĂ఺࿰ϯ඾ࠤ
ᆃĉ 
׎၁Ă઼̚Вயᛨଂֽಶ̙ߏ̙Զ̙љ۞݈ᛂᓑё۞
ВயᛨĂ።Ϋ˵ᙋځ̙ਕԆБ޷໰Вய઼ᅫ۞޽ϯд઼̚
ซҖࢭ׻Ą༊ѐ೻̂ڒ˵̙ᄮࠎͨ፨ڌߏৌϒ۞οႬ̦ჯ
ҹĂٙͽ΁ࣇ̝ม۞ᙯܼົଂତצ޽ጱăஎ̼Ϭ࠼ז౵௣
ՙෘĄ઼̚ВயᛨјΑ۞ᙯᔣдٺ઼̼̚Ă˵ಶߏޢֽٙ
ᄲ۞“઼֕̚ё۞ۤົ͹ཌྷ྽ྮ”Ą 
੺ҹޥ۞඾Щኢᕝಶߏགྷᑻૄᖂՙؠ˯ᆸޙ᎝Ă༊̂
ౙుՎٸฟኜкᅳાឰռᒉགྷᑻซˢ̝ޢĂᐌ඾ξಞགྷᑻ
៍ه۞எˢˠ͕Ă၆˯ᆸޙ᎝۞ឭࢴಶυ൒ߏ൑ΞᔖҺ۞
˞Ąռᒉགྷᑻ൴णז˘ؠ඀ޘ۞ॡ࣏ĂপҾߏт̫̏གྷҫ
ѣ઼̚གྷᑻΗጨѯ̋۞ॡ࣏Ă׎߆ڼ෦Րυ൒ົుՎ೩
̿Ă׎Լត˯ᆸޙ᎝۞୬୕˵ಶົ෸ֽ෸ૻধгܑன΍
ֽĄ҃ͷĂүࠎ˘࣎၆Бۤົᇆᜩ෸ֽ෸̂۞གྷᑻཏវĂ
Їңે߆۞˧ณౌ̙Ξਕنෛ΁ࣇ۞хдĂ૟΁ࣇᚶᜈ༊
үঐໝ۞၆෪൑ளٺගҋ̎ᄦౄ̂ณ۞֖ͽᕘใ׎ѣड़გ
ڼ઼ۤ̚ົ۞ᇲˠĂ౵௣υ൒ົజ఺࣎͟ৈӴ̂۞ཏវٙ
ஂ՟Ą 
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̯ధռᒉགྷᑻ൴ण̝ٙͽՎᆹᓞᙱĂ၁дߏ׎̚஝ঘ
ז͉к۞߆ڼ੽ۋĄࠤҌΞͽᄲĂ˟Ȉкѐֽռᒉགྷᑻ۞
൴णĂߏ఼࿅޺ᜈ۞ᄃ઼̂̚ౙν้ޥຐֽ၁ன۞Ą 
̯ధռᒉЋຽछˢᛨĂ׎߆ڼຍཌྷߏλ̂۞Ă၆ٺ̚
઼̂ౙ׍ѣஎᅈ۞ۤົຍཌྷĄܜഇд઼̂̚ౙ׍ѣࢦࢋү
ϡ۞ຍᙊԛၗ኏ࡎĂ૟Яࠎ“ˬ࣎΃ܑ”జ୶̼Ă ѣᙯล৺
၆ϲ۞ᓏࢰ૟ᙱͽ͔ᅳۤົĄтڍͽϒ௚ă็௚۞ؠཌྷă
Ȉѐ݈۞ீЍĂ૟൑ڱᄮᙊȈѐ̝ޢ۞઼̚ВயᛨĄ 
҃ϤռᒉЋຽ͹ˢᛨ͔൴எᆸۤົតࢭ၆̚රϔ୉۞
ೇᎸ׍ѣࢦ̂ຍཌྷůụ̊Ȉѐ݈Ξͽ੼ભ՟ѣВயᛨಶ՟
ѣາ઼̚Ă༊઼̚Вயᛨဳפ˞߆ᝋăᜭు˞γ઼д઼̚
۞തϔ๕˧̝ޢĂಶυืԆјଂࢭ׻ᛨזે߆ᛨ۞ᖼೱć
҃ˬ࣎΃ܑ۞೩΍Ăϒߏࠎ఺჌ᖼೱ೩ֻ˞நኢૄᖂĂֹ
ે߆ᛨ۞ϔிૄᖂᖬᄏፋ࣎ۤົĂ̙҃ߏߙ࣎পؠล৺۞
΃֏ˠĄࠤҌᄲޝΞਕ఼࿅߆ᛨ۞̶ᜊĂ఼࿅ͧྵπ׶۞
͞ёၹޙϔ͹۞િ၁ૄᖂĄ఺ᇹĂ઼̂̚ౙ۞ϔ͹૟Ξਕ
ϤѩՎˢԣి൴णล߱Ą 
ଂ఺࣎ຍཌྷ˯ᄲĂϤٺགྷᑻ੒ᚥ҃ు႙ࠎۤົ੼ޘࢦ
ෛ۞ռᒉགྷᑻĂ׎д߆ڼ൴णᔌШ͞ࢬ۞੒ᚥ˵ߏ΄ˠ੼
ޘᙯڦ۞ć఺࣎ཏវజ̯ధΐˢ઼̚ВயᛨĂ׎үࠎ઼̚
̂ౙ߆ڼࢲШᇾ۞֎Ғ˵ߏ༊̝൑ປ۞Ą 
ռᒉЋຽݎᎸᄃ็௚̼͛পኳ!
˘࣎гડдߙֱ͞ࢬᒔ଀޺ᜈ൴णĂ˘ਠֽᄲౌ׍ѣ
̼͛পኳ۞͚ᇣĄࢶപߏԯঔᙝ۞г߱ౌϡֽ኱᏿Ꮈޙᆷ
фሁĂҭߏֽࣧ۞ܦफξ؎३੃ăޢֽЇޙనొܜ۞ܿϒ
ᓏĂ૟ܦफೀ˼Ѽ౵р۞ঔᙝг૲ޙј·႕̼͛ঈि۞ঔ
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ᑺܜುĄ΁ᄮࠎĂ˘࣎ݱξтڍ՟ѣિ၁۞̼͛غᛃĂߏ
ᙱͽૈങҋ֗۞̰д൴णજ˧۞Ą 
ԧࣇౌۢ྽ĂܕȈೀѐֽĂޝк൴ण઼̚छтТ઼̚
˘ᇹĂౌ᎕ໂШγྤ٢͘Ă҃ͷගγથ೩ֻ۞ᐹ೎୧Іޝ
кߏ෹࿅઼̚۞Ăҭߏࠎࠤᆃ઼̚གྷᑻ۞൴ण˘ڑ፾սĉ
ੵ˞ώгξಞλ̂ă౻જ˧·ྈ̝γĂᔘѣࠤᆃᄃி̙Т
۞Я৵ĉ 
ԧࣇΞͽଂ׌ְּֽ࣎࠻็௚̼͛পኳ۞યᗟĄ˘࣎
ߏέ៉̚රགྷᑻࡁտੰੰܜౘ୹ڑ౾̀ᄲĈ“̂ౙ೩ֻ˞ܧ
૱ຆᆊ۞౻જ˧Ă҃ͷߏܧ૱ѣड़த۞౻જ˧Ă˵ߏέ៉
ˠ౵ົგந۞౻જ˧Ă఺ߏ׎΁઼छౌ՟ѣᏱڱგ଀֤ᆃ
р۞౻જ˧”ĄΩ˘ְּ࣎ߏĂ͟ώ۞ࣧ˾ܷ྽ି଱дĮڌ
ֲགྷᑻგநį˘३̚ᄲĂ͟ώז઼̚Ըྤ۞̈̚ЋຽĂѣ
Ѻ̶̝αȈז̣ȈĂЯࠎԡצ̙˞Ч჌౫໭҃ၣྤćΩѣ
አߤពϯĂ͟ώЋຽࠁዸ઼̚۞ࣶ̍ĂѺ̶̝ˬȈкᄮࠎ
хд̼͛ࡦഀ۞኏ࡎĄ 
ΩγĂ͟ώଂ઼̚ซ˾۞ྺயݡĂޝкֽҋ̂ౙ۞̋
ڌĄፂۢĂ͟ώд̋ڌԸྤྺຽயຽĂயݡ΍˾͟ώĂЋ
ຽଳϡ۞ߏ˘჌ܧ૱؈প۞ߛၹůů͟ώˠ΍ྤĂέ៉ˠ
გநĂϡ̂ౙ۞˿г׶౻̍ĄඕڍĂЋຽ࠹༊јΑĄ 
఺ߏࠎࠤᆃ׸ĉ͟ώăᔹ઼ౌஎצጏछᇆᜩĂࠎࠤᆃ
͟ώ̈̚Ћຽд઼̚Լࢭฟٸ̝ܐಶซˢ઼̂̚ౙĂҭߏ
൴ण̙֭ึӀĂ҃ޢֽซˢ۞έ៉Ћຽݒ൴णޝрă၆̂
ౙࣶ̍გந଀ͧ׎΁Їңг͞ౌр׸ĉΞͽᄲѩ̚ಶѣ͛
̼็௚۞યᗟĂಶѣጏछ׶؟ڱ؟୉“Т໚̙Т߹”۞યᗟĄ 
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઼̚ռᒉЋຽ۞੼ి൴णᄃ็௚̼͛ѣᙯĂҭߏϤٺ
͟ώഅགྷүࠎڌֲགྷᑻ؈ᖹ۞׏ቑĂҘ͞˫ߏଂ͟ώăᔹ
઼۞གྷᑻ൴णֽᄮᙊ֭ۺؠጏछ၆Ћຽგந۞։ّᇆᜩ
۞Ăҭߏ఺჌நྋइϡז઼̙֭̚ԆБዋϡĄ 
઼̚үࠎα̂ྺຽ͛ځΟ઼̚઱˘՟ѣ̚ᕝ൴ण۞઼
छĂᘦؠ۞؟ڱ઼छԛၗ੓඾ࢦࢋүϡĄ઼҃̚ଂԇ΃ฟ
ؕјݭ۞೼̈́ݭ؟ڱࣖநఢቑͽ̈́ܜഇ᎕፥ԛј۞࠹ᙯຍ
ᙊĂՀߏ͵ࠧ፾ѣ۞Ąԇഈͽ݈ĂপҾߏ࣫ഈ̂ݭ؟ڱ؟
୉ࣖந៍ه׶ྻүሀёĂϤٺ༊ॡ઼̚ߏ͵ࠧপҾߏڌ͞
۞߆ڼăགྷᑻă̼͕͛̚ĂүࠎАซ͛ځ۞΃ܑĂ׎̼͛
Ꮾ΍۞͹જତצ۰ிкĂ̼͛ொങ۞ј߿த˵Հ੼Ă͟ώ
༊ѐ఼࿅̼̂ࢭາ҃ซˢ༊ॡ۞ன΃઼छҖЕĂдޝ̂඀
ޘ˯ߏֶᏥ၆࣫ഈ͛ځ۞̂ณொങࠤҌ޿֓Ą 
ҭߏĂϤٺ̣΃Ȉ઼ặࡧใර۞ጼใĂԇഈ઼˧ᘶ
ऴĂ̚ර̼͛үࠎ͵ࠧ͛ځ̝΃ܑ۞гҜ˭ࢫĂ̼͛Ꮾ΍
۞ਕ˧˵ಶ̂̂˭ࢫĂொങ۞ј߿தТॡ̂̂˭ࢫĄͧт
၆઼̚ޢ͵ጏጯᇆᜩλ̂۞Ѧ̄ጯᄲĂд็ˢ͟ώ̝ޢޝ
ԣಶዎז˞͟ώ̂ጏఉϠᮕଅͽ̈́͟ώ઼ጯࠁ۞ԲҿĂЯ
ѩѦ̄ጯᄲд͟ώ۞гҜᅈᅈ̙̈́д઼̚۞гҜĄ 
Ϥٺ̚ර̼͛۞Ꮾ΍ਕ˧̂̂ࢫҲĂЯѩૺྶă˟
඀ăѦ፸࣍ጱ֭ଯજ۞೼̈́ݭ؟ڱࣖநఢቑĂ၆͟ώඈ઼
۞ᇆᜩಶ̙ߏޝ̂Ăҭߏд઼̚ݒ፨జஎᅈĄ҃ͷ༊႕୻
ˢ͹ࣧ̚۞ॡ࣏ĂϤٺҋ̎ώ֗ߏ˘ֶ࣎Ꮵপᝋჯ޺઼छ
ྻү۞̈ϔ୉Ăಶ఼࿅ኬ̟ૄᆸ؟୉Հ̂۞߆ڱᝋ˧۞͞
ёĂֽዮ׽ૄᆸ߆ᝋĄ఺ᇹүࠎ઼̚পѣ۞೼̈́ݭ؟ڱ؟
୉ࣖநఢቑ̈́׎ຍᙊĂಶјࠎ˘჌઼̚ˠཏវপѣ۞̼͛
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পኳĄώˠᄮࠎĂ఺჌̼͛পኳ၆ٺ઼̚၁ன̍ຽ̼֭Ш
ޢ̍ຽ̼ۤົ൴णĂ׍ѣܧ૱ࢦࢋ۞үϡĄ 
ԧࣇனд̏གྷ࠻ז۞ߏ“઼̚ᄦౄ”۞͟ϡݡ·ϋ͵ࠧЧ
г۞ఱߛĄԧ۞˘࣎ڈ̓ଂ৸ࡗ෴˞˘౤ಽ̄ගԧĂᔘྒ
ᚹಽ̄ઇ଀ޝ႓ܪĂҭߏԧдࢶപ࠻˞࠻ᇾចĂֽࣧᔘߏ
“઼̚ᄦౄ”Ą׎၁Ă઼̂̚ౙ۞̍ຽ̼׶ޢ̍ຽ̼யຽ̏གྷ
่่̙ࢨٺֱ֤Ҳԫఙயݡ۞ΐ̍Ăдޝкᅳા̏གྷซˢ
͵ࠧ۞АซҖЕĄͧтԧࣇགྷ૱ᓾ۞“׌ᇅ˘ߐ”Ă׎ࡊԫӣ
ณߏܧ૱੼۞Ąԧͽ݈дΔִ۞኎ߐঈ෪͕̍̚үĂ˘࣎
̙ז̣Ѻˠ۞ಏҜĂಶঘ̈́ঈ෪ă̂ঈۏநăࡓγᅌຏă
ࢍზ፟ᄃဦည఍நăТՎ኎ߐᄃᐖͤ኎ߐඈ͞ࢬĄ઼̫̚
ѐдࢍზ፟۞̚δ఍நጡ˵ಶߏԧࣇ૱ᄲ۞ CPU ͞ࢬĂ̏
གྷפ଀ࢦ̂ࡎ৔Ă఺၆ٺ઼̚Ϗֽ۞གྷᑻщБă઼֨щБ
׍ѣܧ૱ࢦࢋ۞ຍཌྷĄ 
̝ٙͽЕᓝ఺ְֱ၁ĂߏЯࠎԧᄮࠎ઼̚۞೼̈́ݭ؟
ڱ̼͛পኳĂ၆ٺ઼̚၁ன̍ຽ̼֭Шޢ̍ຽ̼ۤົ࿅
ഭĂΞͽயϠࢦࢋ۞ӄଯજ˧Ą 
઼̚གྷᑻܕ˟Ȉѐ۞੼ిјܜĂ̏གྷ͔੓Б஧۞ᇃھ
ᙯڦĂ˘ֱЋຽგந͞ࢬ۞ࡁտĂ̏གྷଂ̼͛۞֎ޘֽޥ
᪻఺჌޺ᜈ۞੼ిᆧܜߏӎᄃ઼̚۞̼͛পኳѣᙯĂ׎̚
Β߁˘ֱҘ͞ጯ۰ॲፂጏछགྷᑻ઻۞៍ᕇ̶ֽژ઼̂̚ౙ
۞གྷᑻ൴णன෪Ąԧࣇᑕྍޥ᪻Ă઼̂̚ౙ۞̼͛পኳপ
Ҿߏ؟ڱ؟୉ޥຐ៍هĂߏӎѣӀٺ઼̚ϔிዋᑕ༊̫఺
჌஄Ъ˞̙Тኳ۞൴णᙷݭ۞ᖼតล߱ĉ 
ᖎಏ҃֏Ăд೼̈́ݭ؟ڱ؟୉៍هࣖந۞ᇆᜩ˭Ă̚
઼ˠཏវــጾѣͧ੼ٺለ࡚ҭߏҲٺ͟ώ۞ะវ͹ཌྷĂ
ΞͽдӀৈТШ۞ૄᖂ˯ፋЪ̂̍ຽ࠹၆Հΐᅮࢋ۞ဥវ
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˧ณć҃Ϥٺۺؠਕ˧ăᄮТᚮۋĂТॡጾѣ੼ٺ͟ώҲ
ٺለ࡚۞࣎ˠ͹ཌྷăّ࣎ૺೳĂΞͽ፬ᐽޢ̍ຽ̼ۤົٙ
ࢦෛ۞౹າਕ˧Ąᐌ඾Ϡய˧ԫఙͪπ۞೩੼Ăଂ˿г˯
ഫᗓ΍ֽăצ็௚៍هᇆᜩ࠹၆ྵஎ۞൑гྺϔĂ૟޺ᜈ
ࠎ̍ຽ̼೩ֻຆᆊ౻˧ć҃ᐌ඾ିֈ۞೼̈́ăፋវགྷᑻ˧
ณ۞೩੼ă͵ࠧ೼͵ᆊࣃ۞ᇃھତৼĂ઼̚ˠཏវ̚ዋᑕ
ޢ̍ຽ̼ۤົࢋՐ۞౻˧Ă˵૟̙ᕝᆧΐĄ 
҃ͷĂᐌ඾઼̚ϔிፋវצିֈͪπ۞೩੼ĂΒ߁̍
ຽ̼ăݱξ̼۞ԣి൴णĂ઼̚ϔி၆ٺன΃ޥຐ۞ତᛈ
υ൒ᆧΐĂᕚ௲ރᝋᑅט˭۞ะវ͹ཌྷă੠Րّ࣎ૺೳಶ
јࠎ˘჌ᔌ๕Ă఺ᇹ၆ٺዋᑕޢ̍ຽ̼ۤົ۞ˠ˾ᇴณυ
൒૟ుՎᆧΐĄ఺ᇹĂ˘͞ࢬଂ઼̚צିֈ඀ޘྵҲ۞ˠ
ཏ͹ࢋߏ઼̚ྺՅ׶ܧ͕̚ݱξгડĂົ̙ᕝயϠዋᑕ̍
ຽ̼ۤົ۞̂ณ౻જ˧ćΩ˘͞ࢬдצିֈ඀ޘྵ੼۞ˠ
ཏ͕̈́̚ݱξ̚ົ̙ᕝயϠዋᑕޢ̍ຽ̼ۤົᅮࢋ۞ˠ˧
ྤ໚Ă઼҃̚၆ѩ׌჌ˠ˧ྤ໚ౌΞͽ೩ֻྵ̂۞ᇴณĂ
Яѩ׍ѣ೩ֻ఺჌஄хݭۤົགྷᑻ൴णล߱ٙᅮࢋ۞ˠ˧
ྤ໚Ăࠎ઼̚གྷᑻ۞޺ᜈ൴ण೩ֻˠ˧˯۞͚޺Ą 
Ϥٺ΍ྤˠ۞ಏ˘ĂЋຽგந̚۞؟ڱ؟୉ࣖந៍ه
˘дЋຽЋຽܑ̚ன଀౵ࠎ·̶Ăጱ࡭۞Ӏၑ˵ߏ౵ࠎځ
ពĄԧࣇᑕྍ࠻זĂϤٺռᒉЋຽд઼̚གྷᑻ̚۞гҜ෸
ֽ෸ࢦࢋĂ׎გந̼͛˜ߏܳј׎གྷᑻјಶ۞ࢦࢋ௡јొ
̶ĂЯѩԧࣇᑕྍΐૻ၆ಶ઼̚็௚̼͛၆Ћຽგந۞ᇆ
ᜩ۞ࡁտĄ 
̼͛д˘ؠ۞ॡ࣏ߏᅮࢋ“ܛӶ”۞Ăಶߏ˘჌̼͛পኳ
ਕӎజۺؠ˜ҌଯૣĂᄃ఺჌ֶ̼͛ٙܢ۞၁វ۞ტЪ઼
˧পҾߏགྷᑻ၁˧Ă׍ѣܧ૱૜̷۞ᙯܼĄ࣫ഈ̼̝͛ٙ
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ͽజᄮࠎАซĂޝ̂඀ޘ˯дٺ༊ॡ۞઼̚ጾѣͧ׹ᙝ઼
छՀк۞ੑಱćࡻ઼۞Ӗ͹ϲጳטޘഅགྷజᇃھކೳĂޝ
̂඀ޘдٺࡻ઼۞̍ຽ͛ځ౹ౄ˞Հк۞ੑಱć઼࡚̼͛
̝ٙͽਕૉјࠎ༊̫͵ࠧ۞͹߹̼͛Ă඗၆̙ߏֶᏥ˟ጼ
ͽޢ͟ৈځព۞ᜦ྽៌ፖĂ҃дٺ͚ᇣ׎ፖҖ൑ԟ۞ૻ̂
઼˧ć͟ώ఺ᇹ˘࣎дֲ߷ҕๅ㔏㔏۞ጼୀ઼Ă׎̼͛ሗ
߹̝ٙͽᔘਕૉགྷ૱͔ᅳֲ߷Ă͹ࢋߏֶያฯݓ۞ੑ˧Ą
֤ᆃĂߊ൒͟ώგந̼͛ΞͽЯࠎགྷᑻᓄၷ҃జჍࠎ“͵ࠧ
ௐ˘”Ă༊઼̚གྷᑻᒔ଀ܜ֖൴णăд༊̫͵ࠧᇃצᙯڦ۞
ॡ࣏Ăԧࣇ՟ѣநϤᘃႷҋ̼֗͛۞ன΃Я̄Ă˵՟ѣந
Ϥ̙ᄮৌࡁտ઼̼͛̚পኳ၆ٺ઼̚၁னன΃̼۞᎕ໂү
ϡĄ 
 
